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Forgetting ISIS: Enmity, Drive and Repetition in Security Discourse 
Charlotte Heath-Kelly 
 
Abstract:  This paper explores the reconstitution and repetition of threat imaginaries in 
security discourse, with particular focus on the War on Terror era. Upon vanquishing the 
enemy (whether an individual militant or militant group) no tangible increase in ‘security’ is 
claimed by securitising actors. Instead, the security apparatus turns away and reconstructs 
the figuration of insecurity elsewhere. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS replace each other as 
signifiers for the most profound threat to international order. The article positions this 
compulsive refiguration of enemies within an aversion to attaining a state of ‘security’. The 
paper uses psychoanalytic concepts of drive and jouissance to argue that security 
imaginaries play out fantasies of insecurity to suture the symbiotic relationship between 
subjectivity and power. If enmity was permanently ended or victory attained, society would 
need to confront the continued experience of ‘lack’ (ontological insecurity) – something 
promised to disappear upon the resolution of hostilities. The fantasy of interpellation would 
collapse at this point. The article contributes to Critical Security Studies by explicitly 
addressing the repetitive constitution of terrorist threats. It goes beyond constructivist 
understandings of othering to explain why the resolution of insecurity is disavowed and why 
enmity is continually restaged. 
 
Keywords:  terrorism; insecurity; psychoanalysis; repetition; enmity. 
 
Introduction1 
Security never seems to make any progress. Despite military investments, security reviews 
and ever more powerful technological surveillance, European and North American 
populations are continually represented as unsafe. The most powerful states in the world, 
enjoying historically unprecedented levels of health, prosperity and stability, are 
simultaneously the most hysterically possessed by security-related fears. The compulsion to 
experience the self as insecure, despite evidence to the contrary, is the starting point for 
this paper. 
Much has been written about political anxiety in the fields of Political Theory and 
Sociology.  Corey Robin has explored the developing permutations of fear in Western 
                                                          
1 The author is very grateful to Daniel Monk and two anonymous reviewers for providing exceptional guidance 
through the review process. This was not an easy paper to write and I relied upon their generosity. All 
remaining inconsistencies are of course my own.   
philosophical thought as an operational concept (Robin 2004); Frank Furedi has explored 
how the social alienation and declining community ties associated with contemporary 
neoliberalism have led to cultures of insecurity (Furedi 2002); and Anthony Giddens and 
Ulrich Beck have both written about the transformation of risk and anxiety in an age where 
technology produces its own, sometimes existential, dangers (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). 
Fear and risk are prominent topics on Sociological and Philosophical landscapes.  
Not wanting to be left behind, International Relations has also produced substantial 
literatures on the risk discourses and anxieties which dominate contemporary political life.  
Much of this research was initially located within the Copenhagen School of securitization 
theory, which analysed the construction of threat by political elites and the centrality of 
speech acts to processes of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 2012a; McDonald 
2008). The functionality of securitization is here understood in terms of identity: identifying 
and invoking an external threat serves to performatively constitute the nation (Jackson 
2005; McCrisken 2003).  
In the wake of Securitization Theory, European International Relations developed a 
poststructuralist critique of Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ thesis. In their rethinking of risk, Claudia 
Aradau and Rens Van Munster critiqued Beck’s macro-sociological assumptions that risks 
exist independently in the world from the governmental technologies which invoke them 
(Aradau & Van Munster 2008). The incalculability of contemporary risks does not make 
them ungovernable, as Beck suggests; rather governance structures have shifted to 
incorporate the unpredictability of certain dangers into precautionary risk management. 
Incalculability becomes the modality of security2. Poststructuralist IR has found fertile 
terrain in the idea of risks and their governance. Pushing this research beyond its focus on 
the security sector, Emmy Eklundh, Andreja Zevnik and Emmanuel Pierre-Guittet have 
explored the logics of anxiety at play in austerity politics and security governance, and the 
anxious and resistant subjectivities produced therein (Eklundh et al. 2017). 
But what does it mean to centralise anxiety, fear and risk in Western political and 
sociological thought at a time of relative geopolitical stability and wealth? In his own take on 
the politics of anxiety, Mark Neocleous (2000) tackled the proliferation of (in)security and 
risk discourse in Sociology and International Relations, arguing that the acceleration of 
(in)securitization reflects the policing of civil society to protect bourgeois property and 
status. The articulation of pollution, terrorism and migration as security threats depoliticises 
them; it silences the social and political creation of these issues, enabling governing 
structures to pursue technocratic solutions which efface the real genesis of threats: capital 
accumulation. 
It is important to note that the arguments made by Neocleous, poststructuralist 
scholars of risk, and securitization theorists share more in common than their focus on 
                                                          
2 See also: Amoore & De Goede 2008; De Goede 2008;  
political anxiety. They all also describe ambivalence within security practices towards the 
threat object. While politicians promise that destroying the enemy will bring about 
resolution and ontological stability, IR literatures show that frames of enmity enable the 
pursuit of other goals: biopolitical governance, identity consolidation and the furtherance of 
capital accumulation. There is a gap between security and its threat object. The threat 
object is made hyper-significant in political discourse, but it is simultaneously treated 
ambivalently and can be replaced at will. New objects wait in the wings as potential vessels 
for enmity.  
This paper explores how that ambivalence to the individual threat object works, 
despite simultaneous securitization processes. As I will show in this article, terrorist groups 
are over-signified in political rhetoric as embodiments of evil which must be destroyed to 
bring about peace and stability, yet paradoxically their individual destruction does not seem 
to matter. Just when progress might be made, another evil figure emerges. For example, the 
assassination of Bin Laden and the gradual dismantling of Al Qaeda did not de-escalate War 
on Terror imaginaries of terrorist threat, as one might have expected from their pre-
eminent status as representatives of apocalyptic terror. Instead the group was steadily 
effaced in security imaginaries – side-lined by the transition to the figuration of ISIS. A 
similar transition occurred after the end of the Cold War, with the New Terrorism discourse 
replacing imaginaries of Soviet threat. Given this repetition in enemy figurations as 
harbingers of catastrophe, unbound by conventional restraints, the question of the 
relationship between security discourse and progress needs to be posed. How can security 
discourse repetitively frame enemies as the embodiment of total evil, and then replace 
them when their impact lessens? How does that enmity framing recede so quickly into 
insignificance without leaving tensions in the political imaginary? Why do security 
imaginaries becoming averse to obtaining a state of security at the moment an organisation 
is dismantled – conjuring a replacement enemy in their place? There is a relationship 
between avowal and disavowal, pursuit and avoidance, occurring here. 
This paper engages psychoanalytic thought on drive, fantasy and jouissance to 
explore the pursuit (and preclusion) of security as an object of desire. It borrows these 
concepts to explore the constant pursuit, and simultaneous preclusion, of an imagined state 
of security, arguing that the functionality of securitisation is that of endlessly deferred 
gratification. The relationship between security actors and their threat object is fetishized; 
enemy objects serve as temporary manifestations within a libidinal economy, needing to be 
endlessly replaced by another such object. In the following sections I draw out the relevance 
of psychoanalytic thought to the repetition of threat imaginaries, and the simultaneous 
avowal and disavowal of security as a desired, obtainable state of being. 
 
Appetite and Disavowal: Desire and Drive applied to Security Imaginaries 
How can psychoanalytic thought help us to understand the repetition of terrorist figurations 
in security imaginaries and the aversion to attaining a state of security? By exploring the 
compulsive imagination of insecurity objects, and the sudden ambivalence towards them 
upon the point of nullification, one can argue that security manifests through psychoanalytic 
fantasy. I will show here that the realm of drive in psychoanalytic thought constitutes the 
fundamental compulsion to reconstitute enmity, and that individualised threat objects (Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS) are simulations of object petit a. They are immediately discarded 
prior to their defeat, because they fail to satisfy the desire which motivated their pursuit. 
Drawing on psychoanalytic thought in IR, especially Lacanian theory, is a complex 
exercise – not least because Lacan’s writings combine Freudian psychoanalysis, 
phenomenology, and linguistic structuralism to differing degrees across his career, with 
explanations of key concepts changing over time (Fink 1995). As such, this article makes no 
claim to distil an authentic, final interpretation of psychoanalysis in its Lacanian form, or 
otherwise. Rather it follows the model proposed by Jakub Eberle for the use of 
psychoanalytic thought in IR, that of opening up a ‘trading zone’ between different 
intellectual traditions (Eberle 2017). To bring psychoanalytic insights into the study of 
politics, it is necessary to write in an ‘in-between language’ – compromising on some of the 
nuances and specificities of a discipline which emerged through clinical practice, so that 
interdisciplinary insights might become possible. In particular, this article relies on the work 
of scholars who have previously translated concepts of fantasy (Eberle 2017; Žižek 1989), 
drive (Kapoor 2015) and jouissance (Fink 1995) for a broader academic audience. 
Lacan’s foundational move was to reinterpret the Freudian unconscious as a 
consequence of language (Tomšič & Zevnik 2016). The immersion of the child into language, 
for Lacan, constitutes subjectivity around a ‘split’. Structures of language split the subject 
while they inaugurate her. Before it is born, the child’s place in language is prepared for it: 
the parent’s speak about the infant and try to select the perfect name for it (Fink 1995: 5-7). 
The child is then obliged to learn the language of its parents, which has been handed down 
over generations. This language is the only way the child can learn to express its wants, but 
language shapes those desires and provides their content. In psychoanalytic thought, the 
child does not know what it wants when it cries; rather the response of the parent 
(providing food, or shelter, or affection) will retroactively constitute the meaning of the cry 
(Ibid). This parental intervention functions in the same way as language. The Other (the 
parental intervention, or language) transforms the content of desire into something 
recognisable. Lacan referred to this as: ‘Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which 
demand becomes separated from need’ (Lacan 1977b: 311), continually emphasising that 
the structuring of the unconscious and ego discourse through language alienates us from 
the phenomenological experience of being in the world.  
Our insertion into the symbolic order thus excludes large dimensions of our 
experience from representation. The problem which results from this incorporation of the 
subject into the symbolic order is what is left out; violence is done in this process through 
the exclusion of unsignifiable dimensions of experience and affect. As such, subjectification 
splits the subject. Something gets left out, and this has affective consequences (Solomon 
2012).  As Lacan argued in his 1958 report to the French Psychoanalysis Society, entitled 
‘Direction of Treatment and Principles of its Power: 
Desire is an effect in the subject of the condition that is imposed on him by the existence of 
the discourse, to make his need pass through the defiles of the signifier […] desire is the 
furrow inscribed in the course; it is, as it were, the mark of the iron of the signifier on the 
shoulder of the speaking subject […] This moment of cut is haunted by the form of the 
bloody scrap – the pound of flesh life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of the 
signifiers, which it is impossible to restore, as such, to the imaginary body; it is the lost 
phallus of the embalmed Osiris (Lacan 1977b: 264-5). 
Because the subject is constituted through this split, she is always driven by desire 
for unification, wholeness and resolution. Our splitness in the world drives a quest for an 
impossible state of unity. As Jeanne Schroeder neatly explains, ‘it is easy to presume that 
the reason we feel lacking is that we lack something’ (2003). Desire, in Lacanian theory, 
revolves around a fantasy about a ‘thing’ which will resolve the lack. The subject responds 
to its split condition by conceiving of an object, which Lacan named object petit a, as the 
objectification of the lack – something which, when obtained, would supposedly quench 
desire and unify subjectivity. Splitting, then, generates both lack and desire: lack is the void 
occupying the place where a permanent foundation for identity would be found. Given that 
encircling anxiety is unpleasant, the ontological lack is transformed into an empirical lack – 
the imagined loss of a totemic object representing the lost state of pre-linguistic enjoyment 
(Eberle 2017; Lacan 1977a; Stavrakakis 1999; Žižek 1989). The subject can then pursue the 
lost object (object petit a) whose recapture offers the (false) promise of completeness and 
wholeness.  
Object petit a can either be an object of delight or disgust (Schroeder 2003). If 
delight, then the fantasy narrates that the rift in ourselves and the social order is caused by 
the lack of a wonderful object. When the wonderful object is obtained, the rift is resolved. 
But if object petit a is fantasised as an object of disgust, then the rift in subjectivity and the 
social order is explained by the presence of a polluting, dangerous object which needs to be 
removed. Integrity and unity would be restored if the problematic object could be removed 
(ibid). Our desire, then, constitutes object petit a through a fantasy about completion and 
unification. 
What if security was the context for this imagination? What if ‘security’ constituted 
object petit a as both a wonderful desired object (a state of safety and wholeness) - and the 
presence of a foul, polluting contamination which prevents unity (such as ISIS)? This article 
soon takes up these questions, but first – a methodological note. 
 It might appear that psychoanalytic approaches are built around the theorisation of 
the formation of individuals. Comment must therefore be made on the appropriateness of 
psychoanalytic methodology for the analysis of the social. Psychoanalysis might have clinical 
applications for the individual, but it also enables political phenomena to be explored 
through the notion of fantasy (Burgess 2017; Hook 2017; Zevnik 2017). In psychoanalysis, 
fantasy is the narrative frame which constitutes the subjective sense of reality – binding 
subjects to the social order3 and its reproduction (Eberle 2017; Stavrakakis 1999; Žižek 
1989). The function of fantasy and ideology is not to provide an escape from some objective 
reality (as in common parlance), instead fantasy constitutes, frames and supports our social 
relations. Žižek argues, for example, that there is no fundamental opposition between 
dreaming and waking – both involve fantasy frameworks which structure our consciousness 
(Žižek 1989: 44-8). In our waking fantasy, we are consumed by the imagination of a social 
body of which we are part, which is not split by antagonistic division but rather is produced 
by organic and complementary cooperation (Ibid: 142). The subject submits to interpellation 
to elude the traumatic Real – the ontological insecurity which lurks behind the fantasy. As 
Žižek surmises: 
The process of interpellation-subjectivation is precisely an attempt to elude, to avoid this 
traumatic kernel through identification: in assuming a symbolic mandate, in recognising 
himself in the interpellation, the subject evades the dimension of the Thing (Žižek 1989: 
205).  
The subject recognises herself in the fantasies of society and nation because of the 
split imposed upon her by language and the Other. Fantasy sutures the subject into an 
imagination of collective being to resolve some of that anxiety. Importantly, for the 
application of psychoanalysis to political phenomena, fantasy both interpolates the self into 
the social, and constitutes figures of enmity who threaten that interpolation. When faced 
with the antagonisms which emerge within economics and politics, fantasy protects itself 
from collapse by imagining a polluting being which corrupts the social fabric (Ibid: 142). In 
Žižek’s discussion, this figure takes the shape of the Jew as constituted through anti-
Semitism but the figure of the terrorist works well in the contemporary era.  
The relationship between desire, figures of enmity and the attainment of ontological 
security is a powerful triad in psychoanalytic thought – one with pertinent applications for 
Critical Security Studies. Fantasies can never satisfy the desire for ontological wholeness, so 
desire constitutes a totemic object (object petit a) which promises to alleviate lack. These 
object petit a – objets petit autres: objects with only a little otherness – are conceived in 
Lacanian thought as objects which were once thought to be part of the self (the mother’s 
breast, a favourite blanket) but were then cut away as the infant discovers its own 
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international, for example. All of these might impact differently upon the individual, collective or even global 
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impact upon persons and groups. 
boundaries (Silvermann 1999: 98). Entry into the symbolic realm castrates the subject of 
these objects, imbuing them with a powerful resonance as objects of desire. Lacan 
emphasises that the cutting away of these objects causes them to be associated with 
orifices of the body, given their passing and removal (Lacan 1975). As Bruce Fink develops 
the concept of object a, they are the remainder produced when the hypothetical unity 
between mother and child breaks down (Fink 1995: 59). By clinging on to object a, the 
subject is able to ignore her division – which is the Lacanian understanding of fantasy, 
formalised with the matheme [barred S, diamond, a] which is to be read: the divided subject 
in relation to object a (Ibid). 
This desire for object a, fantasising the replication of the jouissance felt in the 
hypothetical state of mother-child unity, supplies a sense of being to the subject. But, of 
course, this fantasy object cannot fulfil the function with which it is tasked. It is 
overdetermined. If the object were somehow attained, it would provide itself unworthy and 
the fantasy would collapse – with traumatic results. As such, these objects must remain out 
of reach. Importantly, a (security) narrative is created about why the object is out of reach: 
someone has taken it from us; or perhaps an enemy stands in the way of us attaining 
ontological completeness (Eberle 2017). Enmity then comes to structure the objectification 
of desire. 
It is here that the final concept in our ‘trading zone’, that of drive, becomes 
necessary to understand the repetitive figuration of enemies. Drive helps us to distinguish 
between individual objects of desire and the generalised compulsion to pursue. In Lacan’s 
formulation of drive, our entrapment in the symbolic order (castration) causes us to be 
haunted by the lost object (which would reinstate our ‘wholeness’). But drive differs from 
desire: it is the relentless encirclement of the lost object, which compulsively re-enacts our 
castration rather than trying to obtain object petit a (Lacan 1977a: 164-8). Drive is the 
unceasing looping around the object of desire, involving repetitive disavowals that this 
particular object is sufficient, and the repetitive restaging of the fantasy. This encirclement, 
and delayed gratification, generates jouissance – which, although loosely translates as 
enjoyment, reaches beyond pleasure to the excessive, the ecstatic, and masochistic delight 
taken in failure (Kapoor 2015; see also Hook 2017). The distinction between desire and drive 
plays out in terms of satisfaction: desire’s object never satisfies, so it moves from object to 
object in repetitive fashion; whereas recurring failure is the satisfaction (jouissance) 
generated by drive’s re-enactment of loss (Kapoor 2015; Žižek 2009: 62-3). As Žižek 
summarises: ‘the weird movement called ‘drive’ is not driven by the ‘impossible’ quest for 
the lost object; it is a push to directly enact the ‘loss’—the gap, cut, distance—itself’ (2008: 
32). 
This distinction between desire and drive helps us to understand the repetitive 
function of threat imaginaries. Security is averse to vanquishing a particular enemy (object 
petit a) and making progress towards a state of security because the object of desire can 
never satisfy the fantasy. It fails and enmity must be restaged with a new enemy blocking 
the path to ontological security. And yet, the mythical ideal of a state of security still 
remains charged – we don’t grow tired of our struggle to reach it. We don’t tire of our 
failure because the repetitive encirclement of object a is in itself ‘enjoyable’. Jouissance is 
generated by the imagination of an evil other repeatedly blocking the perfect interpellation 
of the subject (drive). 
Given desire’s pursuit of ontological gratification through destroying the enemy 
(which necessarily fails), and drive’s enjoyment of the pursuit as failed, a constant stream of 
enemy figurations is produced to sustain the social fantasy of international society. 
Insecurity scenarios endlessly recur as totemic charades within a libidinal economy. And if 
we reflect upon this object-ambivalence and the recurrence of enmity, we are able to 
conceive of a significant doxa in political discourse: that security is teleological and aims at 
some goal. Within public security discourse, we are presented with the assumption that 
security practice occurs to neutralise a given threat: it does stuff, to bring about change in 
the world. Critical Security Studies has, of course, already radically disrupted part of that 
narrative, by decoupling the purpose of security discourse from the threat-object. The field 
instead shows that (amongst other things) security does not function as the neutralisation 
of really-existing-threats, but through the juxtaposed constitution of the referent object of 
security vis-à-vis the threat object (Buzan et al. 1998; Campbell 1992; Jackson 2005). Broadly 
speaking, the constructivist position argues that security works by instituting a dialectic of 
identity between that which is to be secured and the dangerous.  
Security, in this reading, is thus somewhat ambivalent towards the threat-object. 
However, while social constructivist contributions to CSS explore the functionality of threat 
imaginaries, they rarely address the sudden disinterest in the threat-object (n1), upon the 
point of transition to a newer, more extreme threat object (n2). If security discourse was 
solely occupied with the constitution of identity through juxtaposition against an enemy, a 
lá social constructivism, then it should have no aversion to ‘victory’. The defeat of an enemy 
need not invalidate or disrupt the production of self-identity, because this constitution 
could continue through memory practices. Vast academic literatures explore this very 
phenomenon of identity formation through post-conflict memory (Connerton 1989; Heath-
Kelly 2013; Winter 1995; Young 1993). By itself, the social-constructivist reading of security 
cannot account for the profound aversion to resolution within security imaginaries. It 
cannot account for security’s radical ambivalence towards the threat-object, such that it 
loses interest before the enemy (n1) is destroyed – already favouring a bigger, badder, 
even-more-apocalyptic enemy (n2). However, as I will argue in the following sections, these 
dynamics of repetition, compulsion and aversion can be modelled through the application of 
psychoanalytic concepts of drive and desire.  
 
Forgetting Bin Laden and the Taliban, and Preparing to Forget ISIS 
To return to the starting premise of this paper, security never seems to make any progress. 
Despite engaging in myriad military battles, the defeat of enemies does not bring security – 
rather the enemy seems to respawn in another arena, as the eternally recurrent presence of 
insecurity. Insecurity is never resolved by the neutralisation of individual ‘threat objects’ like 
the Soviet Union, the Taliban or Al Qaeda. They are quickly forgotten and their 
neutralisation does not confer a state of security upon the world. Indeed, the disappearance 
of an enemy provokes consternation and dislocation for international actors deprived of the 
object of their attentions. Barry Buzan, for example, has noted that Washington 
experienced a ‘threat deficit’ at the end of the Cold War (Buzan 2007). He argues that the 
US’ attempts to find a replacement threat object for the Soviet Union involved figuring 
Japan, China, the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ and then ‘rogue states’ as enemies of international 
society – before the War on Terror appropriated the mantle of the new long war. Similarly, 
Alexandra Homolar analyses the shift in US foreign policy strategic narratives after the end 
of the Cold War, finding that the absence of the Soviet threat was paradoxically interpreted 
as somewhat threatening: narrated as the coming of a new era of uncertainty (Homolar 
2011). The absence of the Soviet enemy was discursively reinscribed as a move away from 
‘traditional and predictable’ global political order. This reification of a global state of 
uncertainty then enabled strategic discourse to constitute ‘irrational’ and ‘unpredictable’ 
actors as the new embodiment of insecurity: rogue states (Homolar 2011: 710).  
Complimentary research by Chin Kuei Tsui has also noted nostalgia for enmity in US 
strategic discourse in the aftermath of the Cold War. The collapse of anxieties about 
mutually assured nuclear destruction did not foster a climate of security and relaxation. 
Instead, security and cultural industries rapidly intensified their figuration of a new 
apocalyptic enemy - the religiously inspired terrorist – especially during the Clinton 
administration (Tsui 2016).  
We might suggest that such constructivist research into US strategic narratives in the 
post-Cold War period implicitly invokes loneliness and ontological insecurity. Buzan adopts 
the most pragmatic framing the ‘threat deficit’ experienced by the United States, describing 
America’s new found unipolar status in terms of the absence of a unifying object against 
which to legitimise American global leadership (Buzan 2007). Being alone at the top caused 
the US difficulty in corralling support for its leadership. Homolar also engages the theme of 
loneliness implicitly, but more provocatively. To paraphrase her argument, the demise of 
the Soviet Union left the United States profoundly uncertain of its purpose as an 
international actor – leading to the repurposing of uncertainty in strategic narratives. 
Loneliness and uncertainty was felt as a deeply disorienting position, but was then 
operationalised as a tactic to reinvent American global identity. The loss of traditional 
international relations and the unpredictability of rogue states constituted the new global 
frame of enmity in which America would operate and find its place (Homolar 2011). 
In this section I will also reflect on the ontological significance of losing one’s enemy. 
Going beyond constructivist research, I will show that even the prospect of nullifying one’s 
opponent is effaced by political leaders and in political commentary. It is averted and 
discursively effaced as a possibility – because, I argue, removing the block between society 
and object petit a risks exposing the insufficiency of the object of our desire: that we would 
remain lacking, despite attaining the thing we supposedly needed to complete us. Where 
Buzan, Tsui and Homolar explore the articulation of new enemies in a condition of ‘threat 
deficit’, I explore the related processes of forgetting enmity frames which have ceased to be 
useful. The forgetting, or designification, of certain enemies is required to both avoid a cliff-
edge where enmity discourse loses its other, and to enable the reconstitution of enmity 
around other objects. 
Threat objects can collapse – but to sustain the social fantasy of enmity, and thus 
interpellation, a process of forgetting is engaged. Forgetting refers to the designification of 
an individual threat object as the referent of enmity while putting another such object into 
its place. This discursive forgetting is happening even now. ISIS are being militarily edged out 
of their Iraqi and Syrian territories (at the time of writing). Yet the celebratory narratives 
found in media reporting and political speeches are tempered with caution, anxiety, and – 
above all – the designification of ISIS’ caliphate as the embodiment of enmity. The 
discussion of their defeat engenders a complex avowal and disavowal of victory whereby 
the organisation transitions into history, to be replaced by another threat object. 
ISIS were once the most widely mediatised terrorist organisation in history (Al-Dayel 
& Anfinson 2017), objects of fascination and horror in public discourse, as well as recipients 
of condemnation from every possible international political organisation. But the tone of US 
strategic discourse on ISIS makes clear that they are passing into oblivion and disregard. The 
strategic and journalistic treatments of ISIS are careful not to triumphally proclaim victory 
however. Instead, they emphasise that new manifestations of threat will emerge in the 
organisation’s place. For example, in anticipation of the collapse of the ISIS caliphate the 
United States’ Military Academy at Westpoint has commissioned a report called ‘The Fight 
Goes On: The Islamic State’s Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities’. In it, the report’s 
authors, Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi, urge policymakers not to understand the 
liberation of cities in Syria and Iraq from ISIS as the finalisation of their mission, but as a 
continuing campaign against jihadist violence through counterinsurgency and the 
performance of post-conflict reconstruction. The report opens with the bold statement that: 
The word “liberation” carries with it a tremendous sense of finality and accomplishment. It 
suggests freedom from something that was previously oppressed [… but] much remains to 
be accomplished after liberation (Milton & al-`Ubaydi 2017: 1). 
In this fascinating strategic missive, we see the simultaneous avowal and disavowal 
of security as a state of being. ISIS is carefully acknowledged as an enemy signifier upon 
whose defeat ‘liberation’ will necessarily occur (their signification of enmity is not revoked), 
however that liberation is not final. The report carefully adjusts expectations for the security 
environment after the removal of ISIS control – emphasising and detailing the 1,468 self-
reported ISIS attacks in 16 Iraqi and Syrian cities after liberation (Ibid). In keeping with the 
opening sentences of the report, security is carefully disavowed through a proxy discussion 
of liberation’s aftermath. While liberation from ISIS is viewed as a strategic success, this 
liberation will be challenged by the continued presence of jihadist cells, post-conflict 
instability, and the metastasizing of the jihadist threat. Security is obtained, but also 
immediately sublimated by the emergence of new threats. 
 Something equally fascinating happens to temporality in this strategic discourse. 
The signification of enmity is moved into the past tense (ISIS are treated as an already 
defeated entity, despite continuing efforts to destroy them in Iraq and Syria) as well as 
simultaneously projected into the future. Before victory over ISIS is even attained, security 
actors foretell the continuation of insecurity after the ‘liberation’ - making reference to the 
Hydra-like self-propagation of jihadism. As Daniel Benjamin has emphasised: “Simply 
having ISIS go away doesn't mean that the jihadist problem goes away” (Benjamin quoted in 
Trofimov 2016). Their military defeat in Iraq and Syria, if it comes, will then not lead to a 
cliff-edge of ‘threat deficit’ for the United States because the continuation of the jihadist 
threat has been foretold.  
This discursive process of forgetting ISIS effectively evacuates the present tense of 
enmity – ISIS have represented the apocalyptic enemy of international society, and will (in 
slightly different and uncertain form) retake their position as threat object in the future. In 
preparing the fantasy of international society for the defeat of ISIS, the organisation is 
designified as the present-tense manifestation of enmity. As such, when military operations 
in Syria and Iraq claim victory over ISIS, no threat-deficit will emerge. Instead ISIS’ caliphate 
will already have been forgotten, in anticipation of the next manifestation of jihadism. 
Strategic actors carefully practice an aversion to attaining progress in international security, 
eternally deferring the state of security until the dispatching of the next threat object. In the 
moment of ISIS’ collapse, enmity will already have transitioned to a new object petit a.   
This deferral of security upon the destruction of a militant organisation has occurred 
before. It was particularly well demonstrated in the celebration of Bin Laden’s death, and 
then gradual erasure of his life, from public discourse. The suddenness of his execution 
could not be prepared for in as much detail as the gradual dismantling of the ISIS 
organisation, so the dynamics by which forgetting (designification) occurred are interesting. 
They are evident in initial stages of public celebration of Bin Laden’s death, then the careful 
movement of his legacy into the past tense while rhetoric about replacement threat objects 
intensified. The world’s most wanted man was discursively erased, such that he never fully 
signified catastrophic threat in the first place.  
After announcement of Bin Laden’s death, spontaneous street parties demonstrated 
the outbreak of jouissance which greeted the attainment of security, the successful 
resolution of the object blocking the path of desire. Ecstatic crowds gathered outside the 
White House and Ground Zero in Manhattan, drinking beer, and chanting ‘U-S-A; U-S-A!’ 
(Weeks 2011). Yet this drove multiple commentators, the Roman Catholic Church included, 
to comment on the ethical impropriety of such celebrations of death. Simultaneously, 
security experts chastened revellers to recognise that the battle against jihadism was not 
over and may have even intensified (Ibid). Psychoanalytic readings of fantasy help us to 
understand these outbreaks of joy, the efforts of political leaders and commentators to 
quell the celebrations, and the effort to refocus attention on the continuing relations of 
enmity which structured the war in Afghanistan.  
Fantasy interpolates us within the social order, through our identification with 
particular descriptors (man, woman, academic). Fantasy also protects its structuring of 
reality from collapse by inventing figures (enemies) which prevent our perfect interpolation 
in the social order and our attainment of ontological security (Žižek 1989). When one such 
manifestation of blockage (Bin Laden) was killed, people celebrated as if their interpolation 
within the social fabric was complete and their attainment of wholeness and joy would be 
everlasting. Time magazine’s photo essay of the jubilant scenes which greeted his death is a 
particular testament to this overflowing of jouissance (Time Magazine 2011). The phallic 
resonance of the patriotic fervour was not lost on The Daily Show’s Jon Stewart who 
satirized the US’ recovery from impotence by showing the state of Florida rising to erection 
on the national map (Hansen 2012b). However this celebration of wholeness, patriotism and 
completion endangered the social fantasy, and had to be sublimated by reminders of 
continuing enmity and insecurity, because – as Žižek reminds us – drive and desire continue 
without end (Žižek 1989). If Bin Laden’s death had signified  the attainment of some 
progress in the War on Terror, then the fantasy would struggle to explain the continuing 
feelings of lack experienced by the population (feelings generated by the original castration 
of entering the symbolic realm). As such, the attention of the American public had to be 
redirected through admonishment by religious organisations and reminders from security 
officials that the jihadist threat still blocked the path to security (Weeks 2011). 
To protect the social fantasy and to refigure objects of enmity, Washington engaged 
in a sophisticated discursive strategy of designification and forgetting Bin Laden. As Lee 
Jarvis and Jack Holland have argued, the Obama administration followed the announcement 
of Osama Bin Laden’s death with a discourse dominated by descriptions of his sudden 
corporeal absence: he was ‘dead’, ‘deceased’, ‘taken off the battlefield, ‘off the streets’ and 
‘gone’ (Jarvis & Holland 2014). This, I argue, began the process of designifying Bin Laden as 
the object of enmity not by denying that he ever posed a threat, but by asserting the past 
tense nature of that enmity. This began the process of uncoupling the individualised threat 
object from its status in the enmity frame and preparing the space for another such object. 
Washington’s narrative then demonstrated several narrative stages which progressively 
abstracted from the corporeal details of Bin Laden’s assassination: first, the narrativisation 
of the military operation in heroic terms, then the re-inscription of War on Terror foreign 
policy as legitimate, and finally the re-articulation of American ‘values’ as a key narrative 
within the story (Jarvis & Holland 2014). The language used to describe the killing 
progressively changed from triumphalist to anaesthetised, while the corporeal scene of the 
dead body and military operation progressively vanished through stages of abstraction. In 
place of Bin Laden, the securitization of the Taliban as the primary threat to international 
society could continue. 
Bin Laden was discursively ‘forgotten’ – de-articulated as the pre-eminent signifier of 
insecurity, discursively de-coupled from his previous embodiment of terror. This ‘forgetting’ 
of Bin Laden protected the fantasy of international society from its own success. It did not 
have to account for the continued experience of lack during a state of security, because the 
attainment of security was disavowed - postponed because of the repetition of the enmity 
imaginary around another object petit a.  
Importantly, this designification work does not only occur upon the military defeat 
or death of the threat object. The same work of ‘forgetting’ the enemy occurs after 
unsuccessful wars, for example the United States’ retreat from hostilities in Afghanistan. Of 
course, it would be humiliating for the United States to address its failure to subdue militant 
organisations in one of the world’s poorest countries, but the forgetting of conflict with 
Afghanistan in public discourse exceeds that. Instead, the designification is so effective that 
few commentators recognise the repetitive constitution of new threat objects in identical 
terms to that of the Taliban. For example, in 2015 Dominic Tierney noted that public opinion 
and media discourse in the US were raucously advocating war against a ‘Wahhabi Islamist 
insurgency group in a strategic region bordering Iran’. In this case, the group was ISIS. The 
urgent arguments made for intervention focused on the uniqueness of the threat posed by 
the ISIS caliphate – totally forgetting the fact that the US was already at war with a Wahhabi 
Islamist insurgent group in a strategic region bordering Iran (the Taliban in Afghanistan) 
(Tierney 2015). 
The discursive designification of the Taliban had, by 2015, erased the previous 
figuration of the group as the most prominent threat to international security – described 
by President Obama as the ‘centre of gravity in the fight against international terrorism’ 
(Obama quoted in Tierney 2015). Obama’s troop surge of 2009 put almost 100,000 US 
troops in Afghanistan, and the cost of US intervention reached $100 billion per year in 2011. 
But the lack of military progress changed the appetite for war in Afghanistan – pushing 
Obama to withdraw troops and expenditure, and leading the US public into a profound 
amnesia about the conflict. Between 2011 and 2015, this designification wiped the previous 
figuration of the Taliban as enemy-incarnate from public discourse, enabling securitisation 
to once again constitute a threat imaginary around a (supposedly novel and unprecedented) 
Wahhabi militant group4. 
In sum, the designification of Bin Laden, the Taliban and ISIS demonstrate the radical 
ambivalence of security imaginaries towards discrete threat objects. As objects of threat 
discourse, they were oversignified as apocalyptic enemies. Terrorist imaginaries positioned 
the militant groups as blocks to the path of desire which necessitated intense strategic 
action. Paradoxically however, the dismantling of these groups did, and does, not result in 
an increase in security but rather acts as prelude to the recurrence of enemy figuration. This 
section has begun to unpack the paradox of repetition and disavowal in security discourse, 
showing how discursive designification ‘forgets’ enemies – sometimes in advance of their 
military defeat – to preclude the attainment of a state of security. Security is disavowed 
because the social fantasy of international society is reliant upon enmity as a vehicle for 
drive and desire. As Buzan and Homolar have shown, the disappearance of an enemy results 
in the uncomfortable situation of ‘threat deficit’ (Buzan 2007; Homolar 2011). Rather than 
enjoying a period of calm, political elites scramble to constitute a new strategic purpose 
with which to stabilise the social fantasy of interpolation. While the word limit has restricted 
a full engagement with both psychoanalytic theory and contemporary security, the paper 
contends that libidinal economies drive the repetitive terrorist imaginaries which structure 
the social fantasy of global politics. Further research could and should be undertaken on the 
way the alt-right, neoconservative and neoliberal security imaginaries deploy fantasy 
through terrorist imaginaries, noting any variances in the repetitive figuration of enmity. 
The totalising and amplified tenor of the alt-right’s security imaginaries might indicate a 
historical process of intensification and fragmentation, where repetitive threat construction 
has had effects upon the identification with a national (or transnational) self5. 
 
Conclusion 
Security never seems to make any progress. This article has treated this aphorism as a 
symptom, arguing that security discourse is radically ambivalent to its threat object and 
eternal defers the experience of closure.  
To date, Critical Security Studies have explored degrees of ambivalence between 
security practices and their threat objects - such as constructivist arguments that 
                                                          
4 One consequence of focusing on the discursive ‘forgetting’ whereby security imaginaries transition between 
objects is that the differences between militant groups can be flattened out. The Taliban and ISIS were/are, to 
some extent, geographically situated entities in control of territory; Al Qaeda, however, maintained a presence 
in countries and regions ostensibly controlled by nation states or tribal leaders. Each had/has its own particular 
ideology. These different groups may come to stand in for each other in security imaginaries, but we must 
recognise that these repetitive constitutions of enmity elide fundamental and contextual differences between 
organisations. 
5 I am indebted to Reviewer 2 for this point, and for broader provocations regarding the effects repetitive 
enmity frames might have upon populations. 
securitization doesn’t operate to identify and nullify an objective danger, but uses the figure 
of the enemy to reconstitute political identity and leadership (Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 
2012a; Jackson 2005; McCrisken 2003). But this does not account for the repetitive 
constitution of threat objects. In the constructivist model states could potentially encounter 
the enemy and take satisfaction in its defeat – conjuring political identity through conflict 
memory (Connerton 1989; Heath-Kelly 2013; Winter 1995; Young 1993). Yet, upon 
vanquishing the enemy no tangible increase in ‘security’ is claimed by securitising actors. 
Instead, the security apparatus turns away and reconstructs the figuration of insecurity 
elsewhere. Despite their apparent differences, ISIS, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda replace each 
other as signifiers for the most profound threat to international order.  
This article has positioned the compulsive refiguration of enemies within an aversion 
to attaining a state of ‘security’. The radical ambivalence between security imaginaries and 
their threat objects is constituted through social fantasy, drive and desire. The compulsion 
to imagine enemies in security discourse is the result of libidinal economy – the process 
cannot stop without endangering the social fantasies of nation and international society. 
Enmity is repetitively staged because the castration of the subject generates lack, and lack 
must be effaced through the symbolic.   
Using psychoanalytic concepts, the paper reflected on terrorist imaginaries as 
symptoms of castration. Our entrapment in the symbolic order (castration) causes us to be 
haunted by the lost object which would reinstate our ‘wholeness’ (a state of security). By 
clinging on to object a, the subject is able to ignore her division. However object a always 
fails to satisfy our desire, leading to repetitive imagination of replacement objects and the 
creation of a narrative about a foul, polluting presence (the enemy) which blocks our 
attainment of wholeness. Enemies can be substituted at will – replaced by other such 
figurations of blockage. It is drive, the appetite for the endless failed pursuit of ontological 
security, which generates the disavowal of security at the very moment at which it might be 
attained. If security were to ‘make progress’ it would expose lack as a permanent condition 
of being, damaging interpolation in the social fantasy. 
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